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HOWARD LOOMIS HILLS*

Compact of Free Association for
Micronesia: Constitutional and
International Law Issues
Since 1947, the United States has administered a United Nations trusteeship for over 2,000 islands, covering an area as large as the continental
United States, and known as Micronesia. As administering authority for the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the last thirty-seven years, the
United States has fostered self-government for the people of the islands, and
in 1979 provided for the delegation of most governmental functions to their
democratically-instituted governments. As a result, the political configuration of the trust territory has been transformed so that it now comprises the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia (a federation formed
by the states of Truk, Ponape, Kosrae and Yap), and the Republic of Palau.
In a UN-observed plebiscite conducted in 1975, the people of the Northern
Mariana Islands approved a covenant with the United States under which
that group of islands will become a United States commonwealth upon
termination of the trusteeship. In plebiscites conducted in 1983, again with
UN observation, the peoples of the other three components of the trust
territory approved the future political status of free association as defined in

*Judge Advocates General Corps, United States Navy, presently serving as Legal Counsel
and United States Department of Defense Advisor to the President's Personal Representative
for Micronesian Status Negotiations. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are
those of the author and do not necessarilyyepresent the views of any United States government
agency.
'The traditional systems of government for these islands were generally not democratic, and
the colonial experience under the Germans, Spanish and Japanese was one of subjugation,
including dislocation and forced labor. The colonial era ended for Micronesia in 1946 when the
U.S. liberated the islands and determined to place them under UN trusteeship rather than
treating the islands as a conquered or dependent territory.
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the Compact of Free Association signed in 1982 by representatives of the
United States and their governments?
This article addresses some of the related constitutional and international
legal issues that have arisen in connection with Congressional review of this
Compact for the Micronesian islands. Lawyers with international practices
should benefit from this analysis and the assessment of its implications,
given the trade and development prospects that free association-under the
terms of the Compact-holds for this strategic and resource-rich area.
I. The Compact

On March 30, 1984, President Reagan transmitted the Compact of Free
Association to Congress.' If approved, the Compact will define a new and
unique relationship between the United States and two of the constitutional

governments of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Under the Compact, the United States will recognize the authority of the Micronesian
associated states to conduct their own internal and foreign affairs, while the
United States will retain full authority and responsibility for security and

defense matters "in or relating to" the Micronesian states.' Once approved
and implemented as to all three Micronesian associated states, the Compact
will provide the three new governments with economic assistance totalling

over $2.5 billion spread out over the initial fifteen-year period of free
association and the longer periods of various defense agreements.6 The
assistance which the United States is to provide to the Micronesian states
will include the services of the U.S. Postal Service, FAA, CAB, FEMA and
the U.S. Weather Service
2
Compact of Free Association, opened for signature October 1, 1982 (United StatesFederated States of Micronesia, October 1, 1982; United States-Republic of the Marshall
Islands, June 25, 1983).
3
1d. For recent report on Compact and history of negotiations, see Armstrong and Hills, The
Negotiationsfor the Future PoliticalStatus of Micronesia 1980-1984, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 484
(1984).
'The Republic of Palau also signed the Compact in 1982, but has not completed its constitutional process for approval of the agreement. See Armstrong and Hills, id. at 492-493, for
explanation of issues delaying Compact approval for Palau. In late 1983, negotiations commenced on possible revisions to the Compact for Palau. In meetings which took place in Guam
at the time of the President's visit in April 1984 between Ambassador Fred M. Zeder, the
President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations, and Palauan President Haruo Remeliik, the Palauan leader announced the intention of his government to
conclude negotiations on a revised Compact and complete the approval process in Palau before
November 1984. As a consequence of the state of negotiations with Palau, the Reagan
administration has submitted the Compact to Congress for approval as to the Federated States
of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. See Letter from President Reagan to the Congress of
the United States (March 30, 1984), urging enactment of the Compact of Free Association. 20
Wkly. Comp. Pres. Does. 44-445.
5
Compact, supra note 2, at Section 311.
6
Id. at Title Two, Art. I.
7
1d. at Title Two, Art. .11.
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Given the Compact's pledge of the full faith and credit of the U.S. with
respect to the bulk of the economic assistance package, the continuation of
essential federal services, and the stability created by the U.S. defense
presence, the Micronesian associated states have great development potential and could play a key role in the Pacific basin business and trade boom
that has been forecasted. This potential was recognized during the Compact
negotiations, and the Compact contains trade and tax provisions intended to
provide incentives for foreign investment-particularly by U.S. citizens and
corporations? Because of their location astride ocean shipping lanes and
their extensive fishery zones, the Micronesian states will certainly develop as
commercial centers and transshipment points. The potential for Asian tourism in Micronesia has been talked about for years, and with careful planning
could be realized over the next decade. All of these aspects of Micronesia's
political and economic emergence create opportunities for international
lawyers who might have an interest in private or public sector practice in the

region.
One issue which received a great deal of attention during the Compact

negotiations is that of settlement of claims against the U.S. arising from the
nuclear testing program conducted in the Marshall Islands between 1946

and 1958. In connection with those tests, the people of Bikini and Enewetak
atolls were relocated and in some cases have not been able to return to their
contaminated islands. In addition, on March 1, 1954, the 178 people of
Rongelap and Utrik were exposed to radioactive fallout from a nuclear test

explosion and have suffered health effects as a result ." Since those tests were
8
1d.
9

at Section 236.
1d. at Title Two, Arts. IV and V. For example, under Section 255 the provisions of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code which are applicable to the U.S. territories will apply to the Micronesian states. Section 242 provides that products imported into the customs territory of the U.S.
will be treated as if they were from an insular possession of the U.S. for purposes of Headnote
3(a) of the Tariff Schedules. See Title Two, Art. V for finance and taxation provisions.
"The U.S. conducted 66 nuclear proving tests at Bikini and Enewetak. The United States was
authorized by the terms of its agreement with the Security Council to conduct military
operations and establish bases in the trust territory, as well as to close any area in the trust
territory for security reasons. See Trusteeship Agreement infra note 17 at Arts. 5 and 13. In the
context of global disorder and the dislocation of millions of people in 1946, relocation of 167
people from Bikini and 128 people from Enewetak to other islands so that the atomic testing
program could be conducted was probably viewed as a necessary and appropriate measure
considering the international security implications of the testing program. Nevertheless, in
Section 177 of the Compact, the United States assumes responsibility for compensation owing
to Marshallese people affected by the testing program for loss or damage to property or person.
Interestingly, in hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on
the Compact, Senator Hatch (R-UT) asked the Reagan administration to consider an arrangement similar to the Compact's Section 177 to settle the so-called "down-wind" cases arising
from the nuclear testing program in Nevada. See Statement of Orrin G. Hatch, Hearings on the
Compact of Free Association (May 24, 1984). Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. The Reagan administration has taken the position that the
appropriate forum for addressing the domestic nuclear claims is in the courts of the United
States.
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conducted the U.S. has provided funding for and has administered a health
care program, island rehabilitation, relocation assistance, agricultural and
food programs and ex gratia payments to the affected individuals, and
communities.1' The cost of these measures has been over $150 million.
Under the Compact, the U.S. has agreed to provide an additional $150
million for the establishment of a permanent fund for the payment of
Marshallese nuclear claims." Under the agreement, the Marshall Islands
government espouses and settles all claims of the Marshallese people arising
from the testing program. 3 In addition to a specific schedule of payments to
the peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap and Utrik during the first fifteen
years following its effective date, the agreement establishes a claims tribunal
which will be allocated $43.75 million during that initial period for purposes
of adjudicating and paying additional claims. The amount of eight million
dollars is provided for the establishment and operation of the tribunal. The
agreement contemplates that the $150 million fund will be invested and
managed so that the corpus will remain intact at the end of the initial 15-year
period, and .will be available to provide support and long-term relief to the
affected communities in addition to the scheduled payments and services
called for by the agreement.
II. Constitutional and Domestic Law Issues Posed
As the preceding general description of the Compact indicates, the proposed free association relationship raises numerous questions of law and
policy. As the U.S. constitutional process for approval of the Compact
proceeds, it is appropriate to address certain concerns which have been
expressed with respect to the procedure the Executive Branch followed in
negotiating the Compact, as well as those procedures it proposes be followed in approving the Compact and seeking termination of the trusteeship.
Questions have been posed as to whether or not the policy of the present
Administration-as well as the three preceding administrations-to seek
termination of the trusteeship based on negotiated political status agreements has adequately taken into account Congressional interests and responsibilities with respect to trusteeship affairs. Concerns have also been
expressed regarding the constitutional implications of Compact approval in
the context of the federal government's legal and political relationships with
United States territories.'
"See U.S. Public Laws 88-485, 94-34, 94-367, 95-26, 95-74, 95-134, 95-348, 95-465,
96-126, 96-205, 96-514, 96-597, 97-100, 97-257.
"See Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the
Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association (on
file at the Office for Micronesian Status Negotiations, Washington, D.C. 20240).
3
' 1d. at Art. X. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
'"Prior to discussing these issues in some depth below, it is interesting to note that these
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A. TERRITORIAL CLAUSE ISSUE

Members of Congress and interested observers have expressed that,
pursuant to the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution, 5 Congress rather
than the President should provide for governance of Micronesia in the
future to ensure the orderly formulation and implementation of United
States policy relating to Micronesia. The contrary view is that due to the
unique status of the trust territory, the authority of the political branches of
the U.S. government over trusteeship affairs derives from constitutional
sources other than the territorial clause, and that the decision to negotiate a
new political status for the peoples of the trust territory represents a constitutionally proper exercise of the President's authority to conduct foreign
affairs.16 Moreover, it is suggested that the territorial clause issue is more

concerns and questions are being raised primarily in the House of Representatives, where the
leadership of the concerned committee has indicated that the exhaustive schedule of hearings
on the Compact which have been underway since last spring will prevent early House action of
the Compact. In the Senate, on the other hand, deliberations on the Compact have not focused
on the same questions which have been raised in the House. As a result, the atmosphere in the
Senate seems more favorable to early action on the agreement and prompt implementation of
the democratic mandate of the Micronesian plebiscites.
There is a high degree of bipartisan interest in and support for the Compact in both Houses of
Congress. The fundamentals of free association and much of the substance of the Compact were
negotiated by President Carter's chief negotiator, Peter Rosenblatt. However, President
Reagan's representative to the status talks, Ambassador Fred Zeder, is given credit as the
tough but creative negotiator who tackled the thorny outstanding issues and completed the
agreement. Thus, both political parties have a stake in the Compact and can be expected to
share in taking credit for delivering on self-determination for the Micronesians.
"5Congress is recognized as having plenary authority over territories and possessions of the
United States under Article IV, Section 3, Clause t of the Constitution, which reads: "The
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States..." In light of the territorial
clause members of Congress have on numerous occasions questioned the propriety of Executive branch initiatives relating to the administration of territories-including the trust territory.
See, Statement of Ron de Lugo, Delegate to Congress from the Virgin Islands, Hearings on
Budget of the Government of the United States for Fiscal Year 1985, Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, (Feb. 7, 1984), Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks, House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.; also, Statement of Jonathan
M. Weisgall, Legal Counsel for the People of Bikini, Id., for an interesting analysis of this issue.
See Letters of Senator James A. McClure and Representatives Udall and Lujan, infra notes 46
and 47, with respect to Congressional oversight of Executive branch actions affecting terri-

tories.
6

The President's foreign affairs authority derives from the treaty-making power granted
under Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, and it is recognized that the
President is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. U.S.
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, N.Y. 1936, 57 S.Ct. 216, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L.Ed. 255.
U.S. v. Pink, N.Y. 1942, 62 S.Ct. 552, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L.Ed. 796. Negotiations with
representatives of foreign citizens regarding political status agreements which will provide the
basis for terminating an agreement between the United States and the Security Council of the
UN clearly involves primarily foreign policy interests. See note 43 and part II.B. infra,
regarding applicability of territorial clause to trusteeship affairs. Even where the territorial
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academic than of real constitutional substance. By proceeding on the premise that the negotiated instruments which will provide the basis for termination of the trusteeship will be subject to Congressional acceptance as was the
instrument of its creation, the Executive Branch has ensured that the
constitutional authority of the Congress and the President will be exercised
with respect to trusteeship termination in an entirely proper and complementary manner.17

Specifically, with respect to agreements establishing future political status
arrangements which will be in effect upon termination of the trusteeship, it
is submitted that negotiation of appropriate status agreements by a representative of the President and their subsequent approval by both Houses of
Congress is the correct constitutional procedure to be employed. This
negotiation and approval process is firmly rooted in United States constitutional practice with respect to Congressional-Executive agreements, of
which the Trusteeship Agreement and the Northern Mariana Islands Commonwealth Covenant are both relevant examples." Thus, for the executive
branch to negotiate the Compact and submit it for approval in the form of a
Joint Resolution does not infringe upon Congressional authority to make
policy for United States territories, but rather accords with the allocation of
constitutional authority over trusteeship affairs which has been established
through the separate and combined actions of both branches of government
in creating and providing for administration of the trusteeship. Supporting
this view is the development and implementation of the Trusteeship Agreement and Congress' role in that process.

clause is clearly applicable, the President is not foreclosed from acting on behalf of the United
States or undertaking policy initiatives with respect to territory or property of the United
States. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1914).
"The Congressional approval process contemplated for the Compact is essentially the same
as that employed to approve and enact the Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese
Mandated Islands, approved by the United Nations Security Council April 2, 1947, and by the
United States July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189, (hereinafter
"Trusteeship Agreement"), under which the United States assumed the role of administering
authority for the trusteeship. The joint resolution of July 18, 1947, authorized the President to
approve the Trusteeship Agreement following its approval by the Security Council. The draft
joint resolution submitted to Congress by President Reagan would approve the Compact,
noting its approval by the peoples concerned.
8
Like the Trusteeship Agreement, the Covenant to Establish the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America was approved in
the form of an Executive-Congressional agreement, U.S. Pub. Law 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976),
reprinted at 48 U.S.C. 1681, note. For discussion of constitutional practice relating to such
agreements, see McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPolicy, 54 YALE L.J. (1945) 181, 203-206

and 14 Whiteman,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

234-240, (1968); also, for views of U.S.

Supreme Court respecting international legal and U.S. constitutional status of international
agreements other than Article II treaties, see Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
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1. The Trusteeship Agreement
The Trusteeship Agreement between the United Nations Security Council and the United States was negotiated by representatives of the President
in the context of an historical series of foreign policy initiatives with respect
to the status and disposition of areas detached from enemies as a result of
World War II, as well as areas formerly under League of Nations mandates.
The principles expressed in the Atlantic Charter with respect to disposition
of territory, 9 and the adherence of the United States and twenty-five other
nations to those principles in the Declaration of Washington,' laid the
foundation for inclusion in the United Nations Charter of provisions establishing the international trusteeship system.2 ' The United States delegation
to the 1945 San Francisco Conference of the United Nations recognized that
the Micronesian islands-as both an area detached from the enemy and a
formerly mandated territory-would properly be subject to disposition in
accordance with the trusteeship provisions to be included in the UN Charter. At the same time, America's experience in the islands during the war
made it clear that disposition of the islands, formerly under Japanese
mandate, involved special national security considerations for the United
States. Thus, the United States proposed that trusteeships for strategic areas
be designated as such, and that the functions of the United Nations relating
to trusteeships for areas designated as strategic be exercised by the Security
Council rather than the General Assembly.2 This arrangement for strategic
trusteeships was incorporated into Chapter XII of the United Nations
Charter, and on that basis President Truman proposed on November 6,
1946, that the mandated islands be placed in trusteeship and designated as
strategic under terms agreeable to the Security Council and the United

"9Atlantic Charter, Joint Declaration by the President of the United States and the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom August 14, 1941, (55 Stat. 1603; Executive Agreement Series
236). By this declaration the United States affirmed that all peoples should be restored to their
"sovereign rights and self-government," and that no "territorial changes" should occur except

in accordance "with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."
2°Declaration of the United Nations, signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, (55 Stat. 1600;
Executive Agreement Series 236).
2
See Article 77, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice, Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, ratified by U.S. Senate July 28, 1945, Approved
by President August 8, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945 (59 Stat. 1031; Treaty Series

993).
"See Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the
Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State, June 26, 1945, pp. 126-132,
reprinted at, 1 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 734-739 (1968). Also, see Bunche,
"Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Charterof the United Nations," XIII
Bulletin, Department of State, No. 340, Dec. 30, 1945, pp. 1037, 1043; also, Vol. II, United
States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (1957) pp. 66-68. For
more detailed explanation of UN functions relating to the trusteeship see note 67 infra.
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States. 3 On February 17, 1947, a draft trusteeship agreement was transmitted to the Security Council by the United States representative24
The negotiations and debate which took place in the Security Council
regarding the draft agreement bear directly upon our views today about the
status of the Trusteeship Agreement and the islands themselves in the
context of U.S. constitutional law. The question of the status of the trust
territory under the U.S. Constitution and our laws was specifically discussed
in connection with Security Council review of Article 3 of the agreement,
which reads:
The administering. authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation,
and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of this agreement, and
may apply to the trust territory, subject to any modifications which the administering authority may consider desirable, such of the laws of the United States as it
may deem appropriate to local conditions and requirements?0
The record of Security Council deliberations with regard to this provision
reflects that the words "as an integral part of the United States" had
appeared after "subject to the provisions of this agreement" in the original
United States draft. This language was consistent with language contained
in the trusteeship agreements for non-strategic areas which had recently
been approved by the General Assembly, and the United States expressly
acknowledged that the words "integral part" did not "imply sovereignty
over the territory." ' However, at the request of the Soviet Union that
phrase was deleted prior to approval of the agreement by the Security
Council. In agreeing to this amendment the United States Representative to
the Council, Senator Warren R. Austin, made the following remarks:
...
In employing the phrase "as an integral part of the United States," in article 3,
my Government used the language of the original mandate and also the language
used in six of the agreements recently approved by the General Assembly. It does
not mean the extension of United States sovereignty over the territory, but in fact
it means precisely the opposite.
There has, however, been some misunderstanding on this point and, for the
sake of clarity, the United States Government is prepared to accept the amendment suggested by the Soviet Union, and to delete the phrase. In agreeing to this
modification, my Government feels that for record purposes it should affirm that
its authority in the trust territory is not to be considered as in any way lessened
thereby. My Government feels that it has a duty towards the peoples of the trust
territory to govern them with no less consideration than it would govern any part
of its sovereign territory. It feels that the laws, customs and institutions of the
United States form a basis for the administration of the trust territory compatible
with the spirit of the Charter. For administrative, legislative and jurisdictional
'See
1 WHITEMAN,
24

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

pp. 769-770 (1968).

1d.

2U.S.
T.I.A.S. 1665; 61 Stat. 3301, 3302; 8 U.N.T.S. 189, 192.
26
Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, op. cit., pp. 4-5; U.S.
Delegation Doc. US/S/119, p. 2.
VOL. 18, NO. 3
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convenience in carrying out its duty towards the peoples of the trust territory, the
United States intends to treat the trust territory as if it were an integral part of the
United States. ... 2

Upon completion of this and other similar exercises in the formulation of its
provisions, the Trusteeship Agreement was agreed upon and approved by
the Security Council on April 2, 1947.
After concluding the international negotiating process and obtaining

Security Council approval of the Trusteeship Agreement, the President
submitted it to Congress. In 1947 members of Congress had serious concerns
with respect to creating the trusteeship, just as some members now have
concerns regarding its termination. There were members of Congress who

wanted to conclude a treaty of peace with Japan under terms which would
enable the United States to annex the formerly mandated islands then
occupied by the United States,' while others were concerned that United

States security interests might be compromised by placing the islands under
an international legal regime. These and other similar concerns, and the

rationale which led members of Congress to support approval of the
Trusteeship Agreement notwithstanding certain doubts, found expression
on the floor of the House of Representatives on July 11, 1947. On that
occasion Congressman Mansfield of Montana made the following remarks:
...Insofar as my own personal views on the mandates are concerned... I would
prefer to have the United States assume complete and undisputed control ... We
need these islands for our future defense, and they should be fortified wherever we
deem it necessary. We have no concealed motives because we want these islands
for one purpose only and that is national security. Economically they will be a
liability, socially they will present problems, and politically we will have to work
out a policy of administration. No other nation has any kind of a claim to the
mandates. No other nation has paid the price we have. These views of mine are not
new nor are they the results only of my recent investigative trip to the Pacific.
Rather, my stand has been accentuated by what I have seen and I am more firmly
convinced than ever of our great need for control of the mandates.
If, however, it does become necessary to create a trusteeship for these islands, I
would favor the proposals made by our State Department and President Truman
which would place the mandates under the United Nations with the consideration
that they should be cataloged as a strategic area outside the control of the
Trusteeship Council. On this basis, supervision would be exercised by the Security
Council which has jurisdiction over such strategic areas in the interests of collec-

'U.N. Security Council Off. Rec., 116th Meeting, Mar. 7, 1947, p. 473. The materials cited
on this point are discussed at 1 WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968) pp. 777-778.
'When the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951,
U.S. T.I.A.S. 2490; 3 UST 3169; 136 U.N.T.S. 45, it contained the following acknowledgement
that the formerly mandated islands had been placed under the trusteeship system:
"Article 2... (d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of
Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of
April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate
to Japan."
Summer 1984
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tive security. But, and this is important, the United States has a veto over the
Security Council should it ever want to assert effective control . . . It is worth
remembering also, that until a treaty of peace is signed with Japan we have no legal

title to the mandates 9
Thus, the Trusteeship Agreement had certain advantages for the United
States. First annexation of the occupied islands would not have been consistent with United States policies and commitments under the Atlantic Charter or the United Nations Charter. The lack of a peace treaty with Japan
underscores the fact that the United States acquired no claim of sovereignty
over the islands by virtue of its post-war occupation!' In this light, the full
authority over the islands which the United States would acquire under the
Trusteeship Agreement presented a convenient and legitimate means of
protecting our national security interests and enabling this country to
assume effective control over the islands in a manner consistent with United
States policy and international law. Article 15, of the proposed agreement,
pursuant to which the terms of the agreement may not be altered or terminated without United States' consent, seemed to ensure that the United
States' position in the islands would not change until we desired that it
should." No doubt members of Congress also found these negotiated features of the strategic trusteeship arrangement attractive, and on July 18,
1947, Congress authorized approval of the agreement.
2. ConstitutionalSources of Authority

From the outset, the Trusteeship Agreement was interpreted ambiguously and implemented with a degree of political ambivalence. On one
hand, the United States acknowledged that it did not acquire sovereignty
over the islands and that the trust territory would not be politically or
constitutionally integrated into the United States by virtue of the Trusteeship Agreement. On the other hand, the United States Representative to
the Security Council stated clearly on the record of its proceeding that for
the purpose of implementing Article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement "the
United States intends to treat the trust territory as if it were an integral part
of the United States."
The view of the United States that it had the authority to treat the trust
territory as if it were an integral part of the United States is perhaps one
8733 (1947).
3Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614 (1850); Dooley v. United States 182 U.S. 222,
21 S.Ct. 762, 45 L.Ed. 1074; United States v. Hackabee, Ala. 1873,83 U.S. 414, 16 Wall. 414,
21 L.Ed. 457; 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 547-548 (1968). Also see, Sec.
Council
Off. Rec. 113th Meeting, p. 413.
31
In addition to United States ability to veto adverse Security Council action regarding the
trusteeship, to which Mr. Mansfield alluded in his remarks, Article 15 of the Trusteeship
Agreement states:
The terms of the present agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated without the
consent of the administering authority.
2993 CONG. REc.
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factor which helped spawn the proposition that Congressional authority
over trusteeship affairs derives primarily from the territorial clause. The
better view, however, is that the power of Congress to legislate with respect
to the trust territory flows from the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and
is an incident of Congressional authority to provide for the implementation
of that agreement under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution-the
necessary and proper clause.
It is not difficult to understand how ambiguity may have arisen in this
respect. In ascertaining the proper place to situate trusteeship affairs within
our constitutional system it was clear that the trust territory could not be
regarded as having the same constitutional status as one of the states. It was
inevitable that this new political entity would be regarded as having a
constitution analogous to the other policies within our constitutional family
which-although not states-are integral parts of the United States; i.e., the
United States territories?2 Since Congressional authority over territories
flows from the territorial clause, it was natural enough to assume Congress
would act with respect to the trust territory in the same constitutional
context.
Though not literally or legally the "territory" or "property" of the United
States within the meaning of the territorial clause, the trust territory was in
many ways treated as such, and could not conveniently be treated otherwise
administratively, as distinguished from legally, given the unique characteristics of United States constitutional federalism. Because trusteeship administration was unprecedented in this nation's constitutional history and practice with respect to territories, in performing its role as administering
authority the government of the United States has acted in a manner
consistent with its actions concerning the other territories. For example, the
committees of Congress which exercise jurisdiction over the territories have
been given responsibility for the trust territory, and over the years Congress
has passed legislation extending to the trust territory and its citizens many of
the domestic programs and benefits provided to United States territories
and possessions.33
On the other hand, on numerous occasions United States courts have
ruled that the trust territory is a foreign area and not under United States
sovereignty 3 While issues regarding application of the United States' Con32

See part IIB infra for discussion of constitutional and legal status of trust territory as
compared to that of the territories.
3
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 97-110 (1981), 95 Stat. 1513, extending certain banking deposit
insurance benefits; Pub. L. No. 92-318 (1972), 86 Stat. 350, as amended by Public Law 96-374
(1980), 94 Stat. 1501, extending land grant college aid. Numerous social assistance programs
and services have also been extended to the trust territory.
4See Callas v. United States, 253 F. 2d 838 (2d Cir. 1958); cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958);
Gale v. Andrus, 643 F. 2d 828-30 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands v. Atalig, 723 F. 2d 682, 684 (9th Cir. 1984).
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stitution and laws to the trust territory generally have been correctly decided
by reference to terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, the courts also have
occasionally, and with sometimes anomalous results, drawn certain analogies between the trust territory and other United States territories 5 In

construing the constitutionality of the Northern Mariana Islands Commonwealth Covenant, the United States law which provides for the transition of
the Northern Mariana Islands from trusteeship status to that of an unincorporated U.S. territory, the courts have even applied the Insular Cases
territorial clause analysis in a case dealing with a part of the trust territory?6
Finally, pursuant to Congressional authorization, Presidential Orders and
Orders of the Secretary of the Interior, the policy-level responsibility within
the United States government for the fiscal and administrative affairs of the
trust territory has generally reposed with the same officials within the
Department of Interior who have had cognizance of territory affairs. 7
It has been neither illogical nor inconsistent with the Trusteeship Agreement for the United States, in its constitutional process for implementing
that agreement, to administer the trust territory in a manner similar to the
way it administers United States territories. This has been consistent with
and taken advantage of our government's experience dealing with off-shore,
non-state areas. However, in concluding the Trusteeship Agreement,

United States negotiators ensured that Congress would not be required to
rely upon theoretical postulations about the application of the territorial
clause in order to fulfill its institutional responsibility and exercise constitu35

See, e.g., In re Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1983).
3See Atalig, supra note 34, upholding authority of Congress in enacting NMI Covenant to
determine extent of application of Constitution to the NMI during the transition from trusteeship to territorial status upon trusteeship termination in accordance with Insular Cases; i.e.,
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley, supra note 30; De Lima v.Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901); Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Hawaii
v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903). See note 49 infra.
37
At the time of approval of the Trusteeship Agreement on July 18, 1947, President Truman
issued Executive Order 9875, which delegated responsibility for civil administration of the trust
territory to the Secretary of the Navy. That interim arrangement ended on June 29, 1951, when
the President issued Executive Order No. 10265, transferring civil administration to the
Secretary of Interior. Arrangements for administration of the islands continued to be prescribed by Presidential order until June 30, 1954, when Congress enacted 48 U.S.C. 1681; 68
Stat. 330, authorizing continued administration in accordance with Presidential orders. By
Executive Order No. 11021, effective July 1, 1962, President Kennedy provided for continued
administration by the Secretary of the Interior. Under a succession of Interior Secretarial
Orders the administrative organization which became the Trust Territory Government was
established. On April 25, 1979 the Secretary of the Interior issued Secretarial Order 3039,
which provided for transfer of governmental functions to the democratically instituted constitutional governments of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
pending trusteeship termination. While the TPI High Commissioner and the High Court
continue to retain oversight authority under Secretarial Order 3039, most functions of government have been transferred to the constitutional governments. The legislative function in the
TPI reposed with the Congress of Micronesia from 1964 to 1979, and is now vested in the
legislatures of Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia under their
constitutions.
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tional authority with respect to the trust territory. In addition to the full
authority of the United States under Article 3 to make its laws applicable to
the trust territory-which in general requires Congressional action-the
Trusteeship Agreement itself provides in Article 12 that:
The administering authority shall enact such legislation as may be necessary to
place the provisions of this agreement in effect in the trust territory.3"
Inclusion of such a provision in an agreement to be submitted to Congress
and approved as a Congressional-Executive agreement certainly suggests,
as stated in the House Report on the resolution authorizing approval of the
agreement, that the Executive branch recognized that "both Houses of
Congress will be concerned in the future with legislation necessary for the
governing of the trust territory.""
The authority of Congress over trusteeship affairs, and more specifically
the authority to treat the trust territory in the same manner as the territories
in some respects, is further established by Article 9 of the Trusteeship
Agreement:
The administering authority shall be entitled to constitute the trust territory into a
customs, fiscal, or administrative union or federation with other territories under
United States jurisdiction and to establish common services between such territories and the trust territory where such measures are not inconsistent with the basic
objectives of the International Trusteeship System and with the terms of this
agreement.
Congress has not authorized treatment of the trust territory as other than
a foreign territory for purposes of United States customs, and has never
created any organic union between the trust territory and other United
States jurisdictions over which this country exercises sovereignty; though
legislation which would have done so has been considered' Nevertheless,
commentary accompanying the United States draft Trusteeship Agreement
makes it clear that Article 9, like article 3, contemplates that Congress will
play its full constitutional role in implementing the provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement 2
Finally, implementation of the trusteeship has required regular appropriations and numerous special legislative actions without which the Executive

mU.S. T.I.A.S. 1665; 61 Stat. 3301, 3304; 8 U.N.T.S. 189,198. The comment accompanying
this provision in the U.S. draft agreement stated that: "This article constitutes an international
commitment upon the part of the United States to implement by legislation the provisions of the
trusteeship agreement."
39

H.R. REP. No. 889, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1317.

1OU.S.
T.I.A.S. 1665; 61 Stat. 3301, 3302; 8 U.N.T.S. 189, 196.
4
See, e.g., S 2992, 82d Cong. 2d Sess., The Organic Act of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands.
42
Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands, op. cit., pp. 9-10; U.S.
Delegation Doc. US/S/119, p.6.
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branch could not have efficiently and effectively administered the trusteeship. Clearly, both under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and
through the express and implied powers of Congress which must be exercised in connection with its implementation-including the necessary and
proper clause of Article I, Section 8-the authority for and requirement of
Congressional action regulating trusteeship affairs is broadly based.
For these reasons, and in view of the unique constitutional nature of the
trusteeship, there seems to be little purpose to be served by attributing

congressional authority over trusteeship affairs to the territorial clause.43
Even less desirable would be the theoretical constitutional dichotomy between congressional authority and that of the President with regard to
trusteeship affairs, most particularly in matters involving future political
status and trusteeship termination. Rather, Congress and the President
should proceed with administration and termination of the trusteeship in
accordance with their respective institutional responsibilities and the

approach which has been established through almost four decades of constitutional practice relating to the trusteeship.
Thus, just as the President's representatives negotiated the terms for
creation and administration of the trusteeship, it is appropriate for the
President's representatives to negotiate the terms which will provide the
basis for its termination.' In both cases, the negotiating process involves
4

The Supreme Court has held that the territorial clause applies as an incident of acquisition
by the United States of the territory involved. United States v. Kagama, Cal. 1886, 6 S. Ct.
1109, 118 U.S. 380, 30 L.Ed. 228; Sere v. Pitot, 1810, 10 U.S. 332, 6 Cranch 332, 3 L.Ed. 240;
DeLima v. Bidwell, supra note 36. Arguably, since the United States did not acquire or annex
the islands of the trust territory the Trusteeship Agreement must be viewed as an international
agreement enacted into law by Congress under the necessary and proper clause (Article I,
Section 8) of the Constitution, rather than the territorial clause. While the Supreme Court, in
1948, did state that the territorial clause does not necessarily depend upon an assertion of
sovereignty (Vermilya-Brown v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948)), that case involved
enforcement of wage and hour protections for personnel on a U.S. base overseas, and the
reference to sovereignty was apparently made in the narrow context of the facts in that case and
was not attributed to any established line of cases addressing this issue. Thus, the VermilyaBrown case seems to stand only for the proposition that where the United States by lease or
international agreement acquires the right to take possession of and use an area in another
country there arises a property interest subject to Congressional authority under the territorial
clause. No one would suggest that the authority and responsibility of the United States under
the Trusteeship Agreement is limited to the narrow type of property rights which the Court in
Vermilya-Brown relied upon in concluding--over a vigorous dissent in this 5-4 decision-that
an American base in Bermuda was a "possession" of the United States within the meaning of
the statute being construed. If applicable at all to the trust territory, Vermilya-Brown would
seem only to provide a basis for determining the applicability of a specific statute in question to a
U.S. base in the trust territory, and certainly should not be cited for purposes of determining the
constitutional and legal status of the trust territory.
'Four Presidents have appointed personal representatives for Micronesian status negotiations, each of whom has held the rank of Ambassador. President Nixon's representative was
Franklin Haydn Williams, who served from 1971 to 1976. Philip W. Manhard served as
President Ford's acting representative from 1976 until President Carter appointed Peter R.
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United States international relations with the United Nations and the peoples of the islands. The fact that the sequence of negotiations and procedure
leading to termination of the trusteeship is the reverse of that leading to its
creation (in that agreement and approval of the peoples concerned is a
prerequisite for Congressional approval and termination of the agreement
with the United Nations) demonstrates that the United States has faithfully
and successfully fulfilled its obligations under the trusteeship to promote
self-determination for the peoples of the trust territory. Just as Congress in
1947 authorized the President to approve the Trusteeship Agreement which
his representatives had negotiated, the President now requests Congress to
approve the political status arrangements which have been negotiated and
4
thereby provide the bases for termination of the Trusteeship Agreement. 1
B.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPACT FOR FEDERAL-

TERRITORIAL RELATIONS

The effort to obtain Congressional approval of the Compact of Free
Association comes at a time when the existing legal and administrative
regime for governance of United States territories is the subject of congressional policy review.4 Territorial leaders, members of Congress and commentators are discussing proposals for reorganization of the federalterritorial relationship. 7 It is in this context that numerous questions have
arisen regarding the constitutional nature of the free association relationship as defined in the Compact, as well as the impact which its establishment may have upon the legal and constitutional status of United States
territories. '
The preceding discussion of the legal nature and effect of the Trusteeship
Agreement provides the basis for making important constitutional distinc-

Rosenblat to the post in 1977. In 1981 President Reagan appointed Fred M. Zeder II to be his
personal representative for the negotiations. Presidents Carter and Reagan made their appointments to this post with the advice and consent of the Senate.
4
See Letter from President Reagan to Congress, supra note 4.

46See Letter to Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, from Senator
James A. McClure, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United
States Senate, (March 25, 1983), requesting the General Accounting Office to "undertake a
study of United States policy for the territories and the insular areas under its administration."
That study is currently being conducted by the National Security and International Affairs
Division of the GAO.
'See Letter from Representatives Morris Udall and Manuel Lujan, Jr., Chairman and
Ranking Republican Member, respectively, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
to Antonio B. Won Pat, Delegate to Congress from Guam, (October 20, 1983), regarding H.
Con. Res. 131, calling for President and Governor of Guam to appoint negotiators to discuss
future of federal-territorial relations; also, Leibowitz, United States Federalism: States and
Territories, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 449 (1979).
41See statements of Delgate to Congress from the Virgin Islands, Ron de Lugo, supra note 15.
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tions between the legal status of the trust territory and that of the United
States territories.' Under the Compact of Free Association the most basic of
these distinctions, between the territories and the freely associated states,
will continue to be valid. A thorough understanding of them may be useful
in assessing the impact, if any, that the Compact may have upon relations
between the federal government and the territories.
1. PriorU.S. Practice

Prior to assumption by the United States of its responsibilities as administering authority under the Trusteeship Agreement, United States constitutional practice with respect to territory other than states was limited to the
exercise of jurisdiction over two basic types of territories. The first type was
that of dependencies undergoing the transition to statehood. During this
nation's continental expansion these territories were generally governed
and incorporated into the United States in accordance with procedures
developed under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.11 The other type of
territory familiar in United States constitutional practice is that of the
off-shore territories which the United States has annexed by treaty or
purchase, beginning at the end of the last century and which it has not
"incorporated into the United States," i.e., to which it has not expressly
extended the provisions of the United States Constitution. In the Insular
Cases, the Supreme Court has defined the constitutional status of these
territories as that of "unincorporated territories" under United States
sovereignty." The process leading to the acquisition of each of these two
types of territories usually involved some action or initiative by the President under the military or foreign affairs powers. 2 However, acts of Congress under the territorial clause have been required to constitutionally
effect the transition of territory from the status of a foreign area to
statehood,53 or, in the case of the off-shore territories, to enact measures
providing for their governance. 4
"References in this discussion to the United States territories generally are to the off-shore
territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, American Samoa and a number of smaller
possessions. Under the Covenant to establish the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, supra note 7 at Sec. 101, the islands of which that component of the trust territory is
comprised will become a territory upon termination of the trusteeship.
5'Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, Art. V, appears in Act of August 7, 1789, 1 Stat.

50.

5

Supra, at note 36.
"U.S. Const. art. II, sec 2.
53
See Texas v. White, Wall 700 (U.S. 1868).
54
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 48 U.S.C. Sec. 731d (1950); Revised
Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, 48 U.S.C. 1541 et seq. (1954); Organic Act of Guam, 48
U.S.C. Sec. 1421 (1976). American Samoa is an unorganized unincorporated territory which is
governed as directed by the President pursuant to 48 U.S.C. 1661(c). Under Exec. Order No.
10264, June 29, 1951, the President assigned responsibility for administration of American
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2. U.S. Territoriesand Trust Territories

Establishment of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under the terms
of the Trusteeship Agreement created an entirely new type of political entity
to be governed in accordance with our constitutional processes. For in
contrast to the circumstances of areas undergoing the transition to the
constitutional status of statehood or that of the unincorporated territories,
the agreement under which the United States acquired control of the trust
territory did not contemplate that the area would become subject to United
States sovereignty by operation of its provisions alone,5 or as a result of
United States constitutional measures for its approval and implementation. 6 Rather, in entering into the Trusteeship Agreement, the United
States agreed to exercise its rights and authority in a manner consistent with
the terms of the agreement and the right of the peoples of the area under
United States administration to full political self-determination. 7 Thus,
United States ability under the Trusteeship Agreement to exercise governmental authority on behalf of the peoples of the trust territory must be
viewed as arising not from integration of the trust territory into our constitutional system as has been done in the case of the territories, but rather as an
incident of United States responsibility and authority under the unique and
constitutionally unprecedented terms of the Trusteeship Agreement.
Like the Trusteeship Agreement as it now applies to the trust territory,
the Compact will not integrate the freely associated states into the United
States constitutional system in the same sense that the territories have been
incorporated into the federal process for the exercise of this nation's
sovereignty. To the contrary, under the Compact, the United States will no
longer have the full authority for governmental affairs it has under the
trusteeship, and will not have the jurisdiction and legislative power it has
now, except where specifically provided by the Compact. The Compact will
enable the United States to continue to exercise a precisely delimited degree
of governmental authority on behalf of the peoples concerned, who will
have and exercise their sovereignty through their constitutional governments.

Samoa to the Secretary of the Interior (see 16 FR 6419). The executive, legislative and judicial
functions of government are provided for under Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3009, dated
June 27, 1978.
55
See e.g., Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
6
See Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Id. providing for Congressional
approval of constitution of Puerto Rico under terms consistent with the United States Constitution applicable; also, Northern Mariana Islands Commonwealth Covenant supra note 13 at Sec.
101, providing for extension of United States sovereignty to the Commonwealth upon approval
and full implementation of the agreement.
5
Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 17 at Article 6.
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3. Trusteeship Agreement and Compact
In this context, it is interesting to note that there are two fundamental
differences between the Trusteeship Agreement and the Compact. First,
the Trusteeship Agreement is between the United States and the Security
Council and provides for United Nations functions in relation to administration of the trusteeship, while the Compact-which will provide the basis for
terminating the United Nations role-is directly between the United States
and the peoples of the islands exercising their sovereignty through their
constitutional governments." Secondly, the Trusteeship Agreement can be
terminated only with the agreement of the United States, while the Compact
can be terminated in accordance with terms mutually agreed upon and set
forth in the provisions of the Compact and its related agreements. 9 However, United States authority to prevent any threat to international peace
and security in the Micronesian region will be preserved under the Compact
and can be terminated only by mutual agreement of the United States and
the Freely Associated States. Thus, underlying the very differences just
described, there is a fundamental similarity between the two in that the
overall security and defense authority of the United States established under
the trusteeship will continue after trusteeship termination in accordance
with the terms of the Compact, and can not be terminated without the
agreement of the United States.'
The political status of the trust territory and, prospectively the freely
associated states, is distinct from that of our territories as a matter of
constitutional and international law. The territories are under United States
sovereignty; 6' the off-shore territories are American soil and their peoples
are United States citizens or nationals. Though the status of some of the
United States territories regularly receives comment in the context of
United Nations decolonization proceedings, political developments in the
off-shore possessions indicate no support for any move to "internationalize"
political status issues in the territories. Indeed, territorial leaders seem to be
operating under a popular mandate to keep federal-territorial relations "in
the family." 62
5
Compact
9

of Free Association, supra note 2 at Section 111.
1d., at Section 441, etseq.
6'See, Id., at Section 462 for list of related agreements which, inter alia, provide for long term
United States authority and responsibility for regional security and defense, including specific
military operating rights, as well as United States authority to deny to the armed forces of third
countries access to the freely associated states. Under the provisions of the Compact these
security and defense arrangements would survive termination of free association and remain in
effect in accordance with the terms of the related agreements. United States authority to deny
third country access for military purposes cannot be terminated without United States agreement.
61

See supra note 55.

62

See, e.g., UN Chronicle, Vol. XXI, No. 1, January 1984, Report of Fourth committee
(Decolonization), pp. 61-64, noting that 75 percent of the Guamanian people voting in a 1983
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Those concerned with the potential impact of the Compact upon the
territories must recognize that because of the controlling nature of the
political and legal distinctions, the political status arrangements which the
United States makes with the peoples of the trust territory do not create a
precise or binding constitutional precedent which must be followed in
federal relations with the territories. Arguably, these legal distinctions
provide the basis for separation of policy and practice.
However, Congress' current policy review with respect to the territories
and the Compact of Free Association is an historic opportunity to weave
into whole cloth the somewhat disparate strands of United States' policy and
law applicable to the different types of territories and political entities
having a legal governmental relationship to our federal government. The
history of this nation's constitutional practice with respect to territories is
one of adaptation to changed circumstances.63 The political coming of age of
the peoples of the trust territory and redefined aspirations of the peoples of
the territories require a reassessment of our relations with the different
types of non-state polities in the United States' political family and a
translation of the distinctions which exist between them into viable legal
constitutional relationships and practice.
Although no attempt is made here to resolve the policy issues involved,
Congressional consideration of the Compact and the state of federalterritorial relations provides an opportunity to clarify the precise legal
nature of relations between the territories, the trust territory or its successors and the federal government. From such a basis, programs and policies
appropriate to the status of these various political entities may be formulated. For example, the freely associated states will enjoy many benefits of
association with the United States which until now only the territories have
received, while other aspects of the relationship between the United States
and the territories will not be compatible with the political status of free
association. While certain features of free association may seem attractive to
the territories, the Covenant establishing the NMI Commonwealth clearly
represents a more appropriate model than the Compact for reorganizing or

political status referendum voted for continued status as a United States territory. Also, see
Crawford, infra note 74 at 371-372, regarding UN recognition of Puerto Rico's political status

as a United States territory.
61The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) reflect that the
territorial clause as finally included in the Constitution was intended to prevent disputes
between the states or between the states and the federal government over disposition of the
Western territories. The Insular Cases, supra note 36, demonstrate that constitutional practice
regarding territories is evolutionary as the United States establishes relations with new types of
territories. As discussed in part II.A.1 supra, the history of the Trusteeship Agreement
demonstrates that the President and Congress are able to respond in a creative manner to
unprecedented foreign affairs policy requirements such as those posed by United States
interests following World War II in administering islands not under this nation's sovereignty.
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improving legal and political relations between the territories and the federal government.6
III. International Legal Aspects
In addition to being unprecedented in United States constitutional practice, the free association relationship defined in the Compact is unique in
international practice as well. Free association is an internationally recognized political status available to the peoples of non-self-governing territories as a basis for termination of their non-self-governing status. 5 The
Compact of Free Association will establish a political relationship between
the United States and the freely associated states. It will constitute a valid
basis for international recognition that the Federated States of Micronesia
and the Marshall Islands have entered into the political status of free
association with the United States.
A.

BASES FOR TERMINATION OF NON-SELF-GOVERNING STATUS

Three basic political status options are internationally recognized as valid
bases for termination of non-self-governing status: emergence as an independent state, incorporation into an independent state, or free association
with an independent state. The principles and requirements associated with
these three avenues for termination of non-self-governing status have been
established through the international practice of states with respect to
non-self-governing territories, including the UN General Assembly's adoption of resolutions addressing these matters.' Of those resolutions, perhaps
the most authoritative in the present context is Resolution 2625 (XXV) of
October 24, 1970, the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, which specifically recognizes free
association as one of the legitimate political statues available to non-selfgoverning territories. While measures of the General Assembly are not
directly applicable to a trust territory designated as "strategic" under Article 82 of the UN Charter, the distinctions which must be drawn between the
strategic trusteeship and other trusteeships and non-self-governing territo-

"The NMI Commonwealth Covenant, at Sections 105 and 904, represents a creative and
innovative approach to the issues of federal supremacy, international affairs and organic
legislation which have been sources of friction in federal-territorial relations. New approaches
to immigration and taxation isues are also possible.
6
G.A. Res., 2625,25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 121 U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res.
1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
6
11d. Also, see G.A. Res. 1514, 15 GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960);
G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
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ries relate primarily to the allocation of functions between the General
Assembly and the Security Council, and do not run to the forms of selfgovernment available to their peoples.67 Consequently, there is no reason to
doubt the relevance of Resolution 2625 in discussing the future political
status process in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, even though it is
the only strategic trusteeship. Accordingly, the three political status options
recognized as being available to nonself-governing territories generally
must be viewed as forms of self-government available to the peoples of the
Pacific islands trusteeship.
The Compact of Free Association was negotiated within the framework of
the Hilo Principles,w which define a valid basis for the United States and the
peoples of the trust territory to enter into the relationship of free
association.' The Compact represents mutual agreement between the
United States and the constitutional governments of the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM) and the Marshall Islands as to the specific terms of free
association." Approval of the Compact by the peoples concerned in UNobserved plebiscites provides the basis for international recognition of the
free association relationship defined in the Compact as a valid political
status for the FSM and the Marshall Islands upon termination of the
trusteeship.7 In instituting self-government for the peoples of the trust
territory and terminating the trusteeship in favor of a new political status,
the controlling principle under international law is that the form of selfgovernment and political status established be in accordance with the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.'
67
Chapter XI and Article 85 of Chapter XII of the UN Charter enable the General Assembly
to take cognizance of matters relating to both non-self-governing dependent territories which
were not placed under trusteeship and the ten trust territories established under Chapter XII
but not designated as strategic under Article 82 of the Charter. Chapter XII, Article 83, of the
UN Charter designates the Security Council as the body which exercises the functions of the
United Nations relating to trusteeships designated as strategic. In accordance with Article 83 of
the UN Charter and S.C. Res. 70, 4 U.N. SCOR (415th mtg.) 12, U.N. Doc s/inf/3 Rev. 1
(1949), the Security Council has been assisted in performing its functions relating to the
strategic trusteeship by the UN Trusteeship Council.
"Statement of Agreed Principles for Free Association, signed by the United States and
Representatives of the peoples of the Trust Territory, April 9, 1978, at Hilo, Hawaii.
69See Armstrong, The Emergence of the Micronesians into the InternationalCommunity: A
Study of the Creation of a New International Entity, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 207, 226-227,
260-261 (1979).
7
Compact of Free Association, supra note 2 at Article VII, Title Four.
71
The Compact was approved by the people of the FSM by 78 percent on June 21, 1983, and
by the people of the Marshall Islands by 58 percent on September 7, 1983. The Compact was
approved by the governments of the FSM and the Marshall Islands in accordance with their
constitutions on September 2nd and 20th, respectively, 1983.
'This principle was expressed in the Atlantic Charter, supra note 19, and was fundamental in
formulation of the provisions of the UN Charter establishing the trusteeship system (Chapter

XII, Article 76). See 1 WHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

731-745 (1968). Also, see

G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 65, which by its language applies to trust territories but must in light
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THE COMPACT AND FREE ASSOCIATION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

For purposes of discussion and analysis it may be instructive to measure

the Compact against the theoretical standards which have been suggested by
legal scholars examining in the abstract free association as a political status.
For example, Professor Crawford73 has recommended that the following

criteria be applied in determining the legitimacy of a free association relationship: (1) the association must be freely chosen by the peoples of the
territory; (2) the terms of association must be clearly and fully set forth, in a
form binding on the parties; (3) the associated territory must have substantial powers of internal self-government; (4) the reserved powers of the
metropolitan state (which will usually be those of foreign affairs and defense) should not involve substantial discretions to intervene in the internal
affairs of the associated state; and (5) there must be a procedure for
termination of the association which should be as accessible to the associated state as to the government of the metropolitan state and which can be
viewed as a continued expression of the right of the peoples concerned to
self-determination.74
Without necessarily adopting these broadly-stated principles, the Compact of Free Association effectively satisfies each of these suggested criteria.
(1) By its own terms, the Compact cannot come into effect until, interalia,
it has been approved by the peoples concerned." This requirement has
already been satisfied.76
(2) The terms of the free association relationship defined in the Compact
are set forth in clear statements of controlling principles and detailed treatment is given to every foreseeable facet of the relationship.
(3) The freely associated states will be fully self-governing under their
constitutions. The United States will retain no direct authority over their
internal affairs except where security and defense matters are involved.7 In
addition to full internal self-government, under the Compact the freely
associated states will have authority over their foreign affairs. This authority
is to be exercised on the basis of government-to-government consultation

of Article 83 of the Charter-be read as inapplicable to the strategic trusteeship. Nevertheless,
even in the context of this strongly-worded resolution calling for acceleration of the process for

termination of the non-self-governing status of dependent and trust territories, recognition is
given to the principle that this goal must be accomplished "in accordance with the freely

expressed will and desire" of the peoples concerned.

73
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and cooperation, but the separate authority and responsibility of the freely
associated states in this area is clearly established. 8
Under the Compact, the freely associated states will arguably exercise
greater authority over their internal affairs, particularly as affected by
foreign affairs matters, than, for example, the Cook Islands. The significance of this comparison lies in the fact that the Cook Islands is a freely
associated state recognized as internally self-governing by the international
community.' Under the Cook Islands free association arrangement with
New Zealand, the latter retains final authority and responsibility for defense
and external affairs. Consequently, in theory Cook Islands' authority is
limited to control of internal affairs which involve neither defense nor
external affairs issues. In light of the inter-relationships between internal
and external affairs in such areas as trade and economic development, it
would seem that the Cook Islands is, at least in principle, without final
authority in many areas where internal and external affairs overlap. In
contrast, under the Compact both internal and external affairs will be within
the scope of freely associated state authority under the Compact, except
where defense interests are directly involved. Since the Cook Islands is
internationally recognized as having achieved "full internal selfgovernment" in free association with New Zealand,' it would seem that the
same result would necessarily obtain with respect to the freely associated
states under the Compact.
(4) To ensure that the separate authority and responsibility of the United
States and the freely associated states under the Compact can be exercised in
a compatible manner, the freely associated states agree to refrain from
actions that the United States determines, after consultations with the
government concerned, to be incompatible with United States authority and
responsibility for defense matters. This mechanism provides the most
narrowly drawn procedure possible given the full authority and responsibility of the United States under the Compact for security and defense matters
in the freely associated states.
This procedure appears to grant to the United States a lesser degree of
discretion 'to intervene in the freely associated states than has been established under the Cook Islands association with New Zealand. For in the case
of the Cook Islands, the Queen is the Head of State in right of New Zealand.
Executive authority is vested in her and exercised through the Prime Minis7

"Id. at Sections 121-127
"G.A. Res. 2064, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 56-57, U.N. Doc A/6014 (1965). A
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(1974).
1Id. at G.A. Res. 2064.
"Compact of Free Association, supra note 2 at Sec. 313.
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ter of New Zealand with the advice of a local council. In the exercise of
external affairs and defense authority the Prime Minister of New Zealand
consults with the Premier of the Cook Islands. In contrast, under the
Compact the executive authority of the freely associated state governments,
including the foreign affairs authority, is vested in the chief executive of the
constitutional government, and exercised by such official in the name of the
freely associated state in its own right. Because the freely associated states
will have autonomy and authority in areas that are beyond the authority of
the Cook Islands, the freely associated states will be engaging in activities on
an international plane-as well as internally-in areas which could bring
their actions into conflict with United States security and defense functions.
In view of the foreign affairs authority which the freely associated states will
have a requirement arises for a procedure through which a final and binding
determination of prevailing authority can be made. Because of the historical
factors underlying the United States decision to place the islands under a
strategic trusteeship on the terms set forth in the Trusteeship Agreementfactors which properly affect the terms under which the United States would
be prepared to terminate that agreement-it was agreed in the Compact that
the authority and responsibility of the United States should prevail where an
action of an associated state would have an impact upon and be inconsistent
with security and defense interests."
(5) Approval of the Compact's prescribed termination procedures in the
1983 plebiscites and provisions under which the freely associated states may
unilaterally terminate the relationship after an internal plebiscite on the
issue clearly satisfy the requirement that termination be available to the
associated states and that the procedure employed should preserve the
people's right to self-determination. 83
IV. Conclusion
The Compact of Free Association which the President has asked Congress
to approve will provide an internationally legitimate and constitutionally
appropriate basis for terminating the Trusteeship Agreement and establishing a new political relationship with the peoples of the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia in the post-trusteeship period. The
Compact was negotiated by the President's representatives and submitted to
Congress in accordance with constitutional procedures with respect to Congressional-Executive agreements which have been recognized by Congress
for over a century. The Compact will establish a new type of policy in which
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this nation has governmental authority and responsibility. The distinctions
that will exist between the freely associated states and territories under
United States sovereignty, however, will require Congress to distinguish
between these two types of territories in enacting measures for the governance of the territories and maintaining the close relationship between the
freely associated states and the United States.
The relationship between the freely associated states and the United
States will be defined by the Compact, and that relationship will not bring
the freely associated states under United States sovereignty in the way the
territories are. Review of the Compact provides Congress with the opportunity to take an inventory with respect to legal relationships with the
territories and perhaps to take new policy initiatives. In some cases the
concepts underlying negotiated provisions of the Compact may be appropriate models for addressing the specific concerns of the territories. But just as
many of the benefits extended to the territories cannot be extended to the
freely associated states consistent with their new status, many of the provisions of the Compact relating to the exercise of freely associated state
sovereignty are inherently inconsistent with and inapplicable to the status of
the territories.
The Compact defines a free association relationship consistent with international practice. It is unique amongst international precedents in that it
provides for associated state autonomy and authority in foreign affairs.
While that separate authority is subject to the so-called "defense veto," such
a veto is logically and legally a prerequisite for United States recognition of
the foreign affairs authority of the freely associated states. Thus, it is
expected that the free association relationship defined in the Compact will
not only withstand the scrutiny of the international community, but will be
recognized as a creative and enlightened approach to international association between independent states and emerging sovereign peoples.
The establishment of free association in a region which geographically
links the U.S. and friendly nations of Asia and the Pacific is an exciting
development for international lawyers. The U.S.-Japan-Australia/New
Zealand triangle is emerging as a major economic and political system, and
Micronesia is strategically located to play an increasingly vital role in that
system. Major shipping lines are already taking advantage of excellent port
facilities, constructed in Micronesia under a U.S. capital improvement
program, for purposes of transshipment of cargo between the West Coast
and the Philippines, Japan and Australia.
The freely associated states will also link the United States territories of
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa with Hawaii
and the West Coast. This will preserve U.S. influence in one of the largest
and richest fisheries and ocean resource areas in the world. Lawyers interested in international business transactions who become conversant in
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the unique legal and political relationship which will exist under the Compact will be able to participate in this significant development opportunity.
Investors and businesses from Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Britain and
People's Republic of China have already had economic successes in the
region, and American concerns are realizing the prospects for the region.
With the implementation of the Compact's economic development program, the competition will become keen, and the opportunities will be
great.
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